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AND FUNDAMENTAL-RIGHTS CASES 
WITH FOREIGN ELEMENTS 
JACCO BOMHOFF* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
With increasing frequency, courts around the world are confronted with 
fundamental-rights cases that are not wholly internal to the legal orders they 
strive to uphold. One such case was brought recently in the English courts by 
relatives of Baha Mousa, a twenty-six-year-old receptionist in a Basrah City 
hotel, who died under suspect circumstances while in the custody of U.K. 
soldiers of the occupying forces in Iraq.1 His relatives claimed that the U.K. 
military violated Baha Mousa’s “right to life”—enshrined in the United 
Kingdom’s Human Rights Act2 and in the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention).3 Their case is a 
prominent example of the traditional paradigmatic understanding of “rights 
cases with foreign elements”—claims for protection under forum-rights 
guarantees with regard to forum-state conduct abroad. 
There is a growing awareness, however, that foreign elements may come in 
shapes other than just extraterritorial state conduct, such as that of the U.K. 
troops in Iraq. Take the case of Karlheinz Schreiber, a Canadian citizen residing 
in both Canada and Europe. Schreiber’s Swiss bank account was searched by 
Swiss police at the request of Canadian authorities who had failed to seek the 
judicial authorization ordinarily required for domestic searches.4 Or the case of 
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 1. R v. Sec’y of State for Def. (Al-Skeini III), [2007] UKHL 26, [2007] 3 W.L.R. 33 (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (U.K.); see also R v. Sec’y of State for Def. (Al-Skeini II), [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1609, [2006] 
3 W.L.R. 508 (Eng.). 
 2. Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42, sched. 1, Part I, art. 2 (Eng.). 
 3. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, Nov. 4, 
1950, Europ. T.S. No. 005 [hereinafter the Convention]. 
 4. Schreiber v. Canada, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 841 (Can.). 
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Dr. Ernest Mandel, a Belgian communist academic and writer who was refused 
access to the United States, which meant he could not participate in a series of 
conferences to which he had been invited.5 Both decisions contain references to 
“foreignness” very similar to those found in Baha Mousa’s case, although 
neither Canadian nor U.S. authorities had acted abroad at any relevant time.6 
In cases of both these categories—extraterritorial conduct and other types 
of foreign elements—the key issue facing courts is often framed as a question of 
the scope of application—or reach—of fundamental-rights protection.7 
Although the centrality of the idea of the “reach” metaphor is widely accepted, 
many questions remain about its actual operation in concrete cases. One 
important controversy concerns the appropriate normative basis for 
demarcating the reach of rights—should courts, for example, look at people, to 
be brought within or kept outside a “circle of rights holders,”8 or at territories, 
which are within or outside the coverage of a rights instrument? And why 
should these people or places be excluded or included in the first place? 
Another debate concerns whether courts should determine the reach of rights 
orders as a whole, or only for specific rights guarantees according to their 
distinct substantive content. Finally, there is discussion about whether the 
question of reach is a distinct issue at all—one that should be addressed in a 
separate doctrinal step, most plausibly by assessing relevant “contacts” between 
claimants and states—or whether the question should be integrated into 
normally applicable decisional models for fundamental-rights adjudication—a 
descending scale of privacy rights perhaps, for what you do and keep in your 
bedroom, in your car and at a bank abroad?9 Against this background of 
controversy, it is not surprising to find that commentators have insistently 
pointed to the courts’ “continuing inability to settle upon a single perspective 
toward the persons, places and circumstances to which constitutional rights 
apply.”10 
 
 5. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
 6. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, for example, “It is clear that Mandel personally, as an unadmitted and 
nonresident alien, had no constitutional right of entry to this country.” Id. at 762. In Schreiber v. 
Canada, for example, “The question to be decided . . . is whether the respondent had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his banking records in Switzerland.” 1 S.C.R. 841 at para. 17 (Lamer, C.J.C., 
concurring in the result). Further examples of references to foreign elements are given below, infra 
II.A. 
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment “extends its reach” only to “the people”). For references in academic literature, see 
Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 914 (1991) (referring to “debates over the 
Constitution’s reach”), and Note, The Extraterritorial Applicability of the Fourth Amendment, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1672, 1672–73 (1989) (discussing reach in terms of “applicability”). 
 8. E.g., Mandel, 408 U.S. at 771 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Dr. Mandel, an alien who seeks 
admission, has no First Amendment rights while outside the Nation . . . .”). 
 9. Compare Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 359 (looking at a “jurisdictional 
link” between applicants and states), with Schreiber, 1 S.C.R. 841 at para. 23 (Lamer, C.J.C., concurring 
in the result) (diminishing “reasonable expectation of privacy” for citizens residing abroad). 
 10. Neuman, supra note 7, at 990; see also Louis B. Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as 
Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 31 (1985) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has answered these questions inconsistently.”); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of 
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This article is an attempt at rethinking fundamental-rights cases with foreign 
elements by constructing a set of basic analogies between these cases and two 
other doctrinal areas in which the reach of norms occupies a central position. 
These areas are (1) conflict of laws, or private international law, and (2) state 
action, or the horizontal effect of fundamental rights.11 
Conflict of laws, or private international law, is the domain of private-law 
cases with foreign elements. Conflicts theories and methods are concerned with 
determining the law applicable to private-law claims and thereby, implicitly, 
with the scope of application, or reach, of forum law.12 Although conflict of laws 
has a venerable history as a discipline, commentators have long looked 
unfavorably upon the field’s ability to resolve some of its core problems—a 
widely shared impression being that conflict of laws is “a source of constant 
embarrassment to lawyers, judges, and scholars.”13 Interestingly, many of these 
difficulties are very similar to those just described for rights cases with foreign 
elements. Conflict of laws also faces questions on the normative basis for 
demarcating the reach of forum law, on the distinctive character of the reach 
inquiry, on the roles to be attributed to the substance of specific norms, and on 
the effects of various kinds of contacts between claimants and the forum legal 
order. 
State-action and horizontal-effect doctrines are concerned with 
fundamental-rights cases with private elements—or private-law cases with 
fundamental-rights elements.14 Cases involving state action (the U.S. term) or 
horizontal effect (the equivalent elsewhere) have, over the last few decades, 
become widespread in many legal systems.15 These areas of law also rely heavily 
 
Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2504 (2005) (“Current doctrine . . . provides no coherent and 
consistent theory of the role of spatiality within our legal order.”); Note, supra note 7, at 1672 (“The 
extraterritorial application of the Constitution . . . remains a largely unsettled issue.”). 
 11. The terms “conflict of laws” and “private international law” will be used interchangeably, as 
will the terms “state action” and “horizontal effect.” 
 12. For examples of the “reach” metaphor in conflict of laws, see Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, 
and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1293 (1989) (discussing the reach of statutes); Brainerd Currie, 
On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 964, 1014 (1958) (“[I]nterestedness” 
may bring matters “within the reach of the state’s legitimate governmental concerns”); and Larry 
Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 293 (1990) (“[T]he great majority of laws 
are silent with respect to extraterritorial reach . . . .”). 
 13. Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government 
Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 975, 978 (1994). 
 14. Oversimplifying somewhat, the first description would seem to accord better with U.S. 
understandings, the second with European. 
 15. See, e.g., CLAUS-WILHELM CANARIS, GRUNDRECHTE UND PRIVATRECHT: EINE 
ZWISCHENBILANZ [FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW: AN INTERIM REPORT] (1999) 
(F.R.G.); HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW (Daniel Friedman & Daphne Barak-Erez eds., 2001) 
(collecting articles by scholars from Canada, England, Germany, Israel, South Africa, and the United 
States); CHANTAL MAK, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (Martijn Hesselink 
et al. eds., Private Law in European Context Series Vol. 2, 2008); Mark Tushnet, The Issue of State 
Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 79 (2003); Stephen 
Gardbaum, Where the (State) Action Is, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 760 (2006) (book review). The closest 
available parallel in European Convention law is the doctrine of “positive obligations.” See infra IV. 
Note that all Convention claims adjudicated by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg are 
necessarily against States. 
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on the spatial metaphor of the reach of fundamental rights, this time not over 
foreign territories and persons, but over actors and actions in the private 
sphere.16 They face problems very similar to conflict-of-laws cases and rights 
cases with foreign elements: the normative basis for demarcating the reach of 
fundamental-rights guarantees, the role of the substantive content of particular 
rights provisions,17 and the role of contacts, or a “nexus,” between states and 
claimants, are all profoundly unclear.18 Finally, the general perception of these 
doctrines cannot come as a surprise: state action has long been recognized as an 
intellectually incoherent “conceptual disaster area.”19 
Juxtaposing (1) fundamental-rights cases with foreign elements, (2) 
fundamental-rights cases with private elements, and (3) private-law cases with 
foreign elements gives rise to a number of intriguing questions on the 
relationships between rights and “the foreign,” between rights and “the 
private,” and between “the private” and “the foreign.” What would it mean, for 
example, to say that state action (horizontal effect) is a question of conflict of 
laws? Or to argue that the foreign is in important ways like the private, and vice 
versa? If private-law cases with foreign elements can be a somewhat coherent 
discipline, could fundamental-rights cases with foreign elements be one, too? 
Should they? If the recognized key themes in state action doctrine are the 
responsibilities, duties, and obligations of states, why is conflict of laws all about 
these states’ interests, authority, and power? 
Not all these questions, to be sure, can be addressed in the space of one 
article. The issues that this contribution does discuss, though, share one 
background idea: If “rights cases with foreign elements” were a discipline, it 
would be one with both an often shameful history and a crucially important 
present. But it is not, and this article starts from the conviction that this fact is 
an essential reason why decisions on the fundamental rights of foreigners, or of 
those outside states’ territories, are so often so problematic. The analogies with 
conflict of laws and state action constructed here are principally intended as a 
contribution to remedying this defect. 
The article is structured as follows: Part II discusses some of the most 
common conceptual and normative problems that courts have encountered in 
dealing with rights cases with foreign elements. Part III develops parallels 
 
 16. E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (“[T]he scope of the restrictions which the 
Federal Constitution imposes upon exertions of power by the States has given rise to many of the most 
persistent and fundamental issues which this Court has been called upon to consider.”) (emphasis 
added); Gardbaum, supra note 15, at 761 (discussing “the proper reach of constitutional rights into the 
private sphere”). 
 17. See infra IV. 
 18. See infra IV. 
 19. Charles Black, Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 
HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 
503, 505 (1985) (“[E]arlier articles thoroughly demonstrated the irrationality of current state action 
doctrines . . . .”). For an extensive listing of literature on state action (until 1990), see Barbara Rook 
Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action and the Allocation of Responsibility for Fourteenth Amendment 
Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1053, 1053 n.1 (1990). 
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between conflict of laws and the rights cases, discussing both areas in terms of 
disciplinary identity. Part IV does the same for state-action and the foreign-
elements cases, this time focusing on normative bases and foundational 
questions. The last paragraph of part IV tries to square the triangle by briefly 
looking at the relationship between state action and conflict of laws. Part V 
concludes. 
II 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FOREIGN  
ELEMENTS: TRADITIONAL CONCEPTUALIZATIONS 
A. Fundamental-Rights Cases With Foreign Elements 
Fundamental-rights cases with foreign elements are defined here as all cases 
litigated before a court of State A (the forum), in which a claim for protection is 
raised under a rights guarantee from within the legal order of State A (the 
forum rights order),20 but which cases are not, in their factual make-up, wholly 
internal to that legal order. 
Legal systems have generally not recognized a category of rights cases with 
foreign elements that encompasses all the different factual positions and areas 
of substantive law envisaged by this definition. To the extent that a unifying 
perspective has been adopted, it has usually been that of the extraterritorial 
application of rights norms.21 From this viewpoint, the Mousa case mentioned in 
the Introduction would be paradigmatic, with the U.K. Court of Appeal 
framing the central question before it as, “[D]id the [U.K. Human Rights Act] 
apply to the activities of British troops [arresting Iraqi citizens] in south-east 
Iraq at the material time?”22 
Similar questions have been voiced elsewhere. The Supreme Court of 
Canada, for example, has had to confront the issue “whether [the] Constitution 
grants rights and freedoms to people outside the country.”23 And the European 
Court of Human Rights, using public-international-law vocabulary, commonly 
asks whether claimants or victims abroad could have come within the 
 
 20. The rights guarantee may be a supranational regional norm (for example, the European 
Convention) adopted in forum law, as with the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998. 
 21. Cf. Neuman, supra note 7, at 911 (“The current debate primarily concerns the rights of persons 
harmed by United States government action abroad.”). 
 22. R v. Sec’y of State for Def. (Al-Skeini II), [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1609, [2], [2006] 3 W.L.R. 508, 
514 (Eng.). 
 23. R v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597, para. 84 (Can.) (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., dissenting); see also 
Robert J. Currie, Charter Without Borders? The Supreme Court of Canada, Transnational Crime and 
Constitutional Rights and Freedoms, 27 DALHOUSIE L.J. 235, 238 (2004) (“[W]here does the Charter 
end?”) (emphasis omitted). 
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“jurisdiction” of a member state in the sense required for responsibility under 
the European Convention on Human Rights.24 
Such questions on the geographical or personal reach of rights protection 
have received superficially convincing but obviously conflicting answers. At one 
end stand frequent assertions that local fundamental-rights instruments were 
not “designed to be applied throughout the world,”25 or, in the U.S. context, that 
“the Constitution can have no operation in another country.”26 On the other 
hand, we are urged to acknowledge that a state cannot “perpetrate violations 
[of rights contained in a fundamental-rights document] on the territory of 
another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory”;27 
that “the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution 
provide . . . should not be stripped away just because [a U.S. citizen] happens to 
be in another land”;28 and that the ultimate ideal of any liberal State should be 
“equal justice not for citizens alone, but for all persons coming within the ambit 
of [its] power.”29 
These rhetorically powerful, but ultimately indeterminate and contradictory, 
slogans code for a range of different approaches for determining the reach of 
rights protection—both territorially and otherwise—that commonly revolve 
around a set of recurring issues. The following paragraphs use examples taken 
from U.S., Canadian, and European Convention case law to briefly discuss (1) 
ambiguities concerning appropriate normative bases, (2) the role of 
territoriality, and (3) the effect of foreign elements on the scope and nature of 
protection afforded. 
B. Demarcating Rights Protection: Normative Bases 
Courts in both Europe and the United States have struggled to develop 
appropriate normative bases for delimiting rights protection in cases with 
foreign elements. 
In U.S. Supreme Court case law, a variety of conflicting theories and models 
can be found, ranging from strict territoriality to (virtual) universality.30 The 
decisions in what are arguably two of the most important twentieth-century 
U.S. cases on extraterritorial constitutional protection may serve as 
 
 24. Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 350 (“[T]he essential question to be 
examined therefore is whether the applicants and their deceased relatives were, as a result of [the] 
extraterritorial act, capable of falling within the jurisdiction of the respondent States.”). 
 25. Id. at 359. 
 26. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891). 
 27. Sergio Rubén López Burgos v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 12/52, Report of the Human Rights 
Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, ¶ 12.3, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981), cited in Issa v. 
Turkey, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 567, 588 (2005). 
 28. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
 29. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 30. This part builds on earlier discussions and typologies in Henkin, supra note 10; Neuman, supra 
note 7; Raustiala, supra note 10; and Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: 
Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017 (2005). 
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illustrations. In the 1957 case Reid v. Covert,31 a Supreme Court majority sought 
for the first time to abandon an approach that strictly limited constitutional-
rights protection to U.S. territories, an approach originally adopted more than 
sixty years earlier in In re Ross.32 Reid concerned the question whether two 
women accused of murdering their husbands who were on trial at Air Forces 
bases outside the United States were protected by the Sixth Amendment’s jury-
trial guarantee. In their efforts to replace the strict-territoriality model, the 
Justices sought support from the following principles and theories: (1) a vision 
of the Constitution as the indispensable source of, and limitation on, all 
government power (a principle of limited government);33 (2) the notion that 
imposition of forum laws and penalties should come with a grant of protection 
under forum safeguards (a principle of mutuality of obligation);34 and (3) the 
idea that the question of the required extent of rights protection might largely 
be reduced to “the issue of what process is ‘due’ a defendant in the particular 
circumstances of a particular case”35 (a principle of global due process).36 All 
these approaches, however, were equivocal about the role of citizenship as a 
factor in determining the reach of rights protection, leaving unclear the role of a 
possible fourth theory, (4) a social-contract-inspired principle of membership.37 
The 1990 case of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez38 revealed “the same 
lack of consensus about the proper scope of American constitutionalism as did 
Reid v. Covert.”39 The Verdugo case, in the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion, concerned “whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the 
search and seizure by United States agents of property that is owned by a 
nonresident alien and located in a foreign country.”40 Until Verdugo, no 
Supreme Court decision had actually held that aliens had constitutional rights 
 
 31. Reid, 354 U.S. at 1. 
 32. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (“The guarantees [the Constitution] affords [for trial by 
jury] apply only to citizens and others within the United States, or who are brought here for trial for 
alleged offences committed elsewhere, and not to residents or temporary sojourners abroad.”). 
 33. Reid, 354 U.S. at 5–6 (“The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power 
and authority have no other source.”). 
 34. Id. at 6 (“When the government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad . . . his life and 
liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.”); see also 
Roosevelt, supra note 30, at 2056 (discussing mutuality of obligation between United States and alien 
residents). 
 35. Reid, 354 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 36. “Global due process” is Neuman’s term. See Neuman, supra note 7, at 919. For a somewhat 
different interpretation, see discussion infra III. 
 37. Henkin, supra note 10, at 23 (“Reid does not tell us whether the Constitution applies abroad 
only to citizens or also to aliens. Although the Supreme Court stressed that Reid involved the 
constitutional rights of a United States citizen, the Court did not limit its holding or its reasoning to 
citizens.”). This uncertainty persists. See Boumediene v. Bush, Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196, 2008 WL 
2369628, at *24 (U.S. June 12, 2008) (“That the petitioners in Reid were American citizens was a key 
factor in the case and was central to the plurality’s conclusion that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
apply to American civilians tried outside the United States. But practical considerations, related not to 
the petitioners’ citizenship . . . were relevant to each Member of the Reid majority.”).  
 38. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 39. Neuman, supra note 7, at 975. 
 40. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261. 
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against U.S. action abroad.41 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion continued this 
exclusionary line, adopting an approach based primarily on a principle of 
membership that denied constitutional protection to Verdugo-Urquidez 
because he was not one of “the people” the Fourth Amendment sought to 
protect.42 Writing in dissent, Justice Brennan, to contrary effect, favored a 
principle of mutuality of obligation arguing that because the United States had 
treated Verdugo-Urquidez as “a member of our community for purposes of 
enforcing our laws,” the claimant had become, “quite literally, one of the 
governed.”43 
In recent years, the issue of constitutional-rights protection for aliens abroad 
has featured prominently in the legal and political battles over the status of the 
detainees at Guantánamo Bay.44 The Court’s latest decision, in Boumediene v. 
Bush, if anything, revealed persistent deep disagreement among the Justices 
over the appropriate demarcation of the Constitution’s reach. A five-member 
majority held that the central question of whether aliens apprehended and 
detained abroad may invoke the Constitutional habeas corpus guarantee should 
be dealt with by way of a multi-factor “functional approach.”45 Although the 
majority’s opinion was unequivocal in its rejection of what it called the 
“formalism” of a principle of strict territoriality, it was less clear what 
principle—or set of principles—is to determine the reach of Constitutional 
protection, carving out a role for a possible fifth approach—one based on 
pragmatism and an evaluation of the “specific circumstances of each particular 
case.”46 In a strongly worded dissent written by Justice Scalia, the four Justices 
of the minority, on the other hand, had no doubt about the continued “primacy 
of territorial sovereignty in determining the jurisdiction of a habeas court over 
an alien.”47 
 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the European Court of Human Rights, 
too, has had difficulties developing a coherent normative framework for 
 
 41. Neuman, supra note 7, at 973; see also In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891); Henkin, supra note 
10, at 23–24. 
 42. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273 (Verdugo-Urquidez was not a U.S. citizen and did not have 
a “voluntary connection with this country that might place him among ‘the people’ of the United 
States.”); see also Roosevelt, supra note 30, at 2047. 
 43. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 44. See in particular Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), and Boumediene v. Bush, Nos. 06-1195, 06-
1196, 2008 WL 2369628 (U.S. June 12, 2008). 
     45.   Boumediene at *26. 
      46.   Id. at *24 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 54 (1957)). This approach seems similar in its 
particularism to Justice Harlan’s “due process” theory in Reid. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in 
Boumediene does not, however, make a similar effort to reduce the issue of the Constitution’s reach to 
an overall question of due process. There is, arguably, an element of pragmatism too in Chief Justice 
Robert’s dissent (joined by all Justices of the minority), which consistently refers to “whatever rights 
the detainees may possess,” id. at *49, and “any constitutional rights aliens captured abroad . . . may 
enjoy.” Id. 
      47.   Id. at *69 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Thomas, and Justice 
Alito). 
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delimiting the reach of rights protection, with regard both to the responsibility 
of individual member states and to the reach of the Convention system as a 
whole. According to Article 1 of the Convention, the contracting states have 
undertaken to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction[s]” the rights and 
freedoms listed.48 The European Commission on Human Rights (the 
Commission)49 took an expansive view of this concept of jurisdiction early on, 
adopting a general test of whether victims had come under the “actual authority 
and responsibility” of a contracting state.50 
The European Court of Human Rights did not follow the Commission, but 
in a number of decisions formulated partial tests that it ultimately sought to 
integrate into an overarching conceptual framework in its 1995 decision 
Loizidou v. Turkey.51 At the heart of the court’s overall approach lies adherence 
to what it sees as the “ordinary meaning” of jurisdiction in public international 
law.52 Consonant with this “ordinary meaning,” the court has found that “the 
jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial,” that “Article 1 of 
the Convention must be considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially 
territorial notion of jurisdiction,” and that “other bases of jurisdiction [are] 
exceptional and requir[e] special justification in the particular circumstances of 
each case.”53 Loizidou  distinguished three such “particular circumstances,” two 
of which were drawn from earlier cases. 
First, following the Soering v. United Kingdom line of cases on extradition, 
member states could be held responsible for acts occurring within their own 
territories but having effects abroad.54 Such responsibility for actions within the 
forum having sufficiently close repercussions on Convention rights was based 
on the “underlying values of the Convention” and the need to make the 
 
 48. Convention art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 005. Almost all Convention rights use the 
formula “everyone” (in positive rights descriptions) and “no one” (in negative descriptions) with regard 
to their scope of application. Compare, for use of the term “jurisdiction” in the U.S. (domestic) rights 
context, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”) (emphasis added). 
 49. The European Commission on Human Rights was, until November 1998, responsible for “first 
instance” review under the Convention. 
 50. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, 2 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 125, 136 
(1975); see also Hess v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6231/73, 2 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 72, 74 
(1975) (prisoner in Berlin facility jointly managed by United States, United Kingdom, France, and 
Russia not within jurisdiction of the United Kingdom). For later uses, see W.M. v. Denmark, App. No. 
17392/90, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD28 (1993) (Danish ambassador in East Berlin handing over asylum-
seeker to East German police is action within jurisdiction of Denmark). 
 51. Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23–24 (1995). 
 52. See, e.g., Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 351. The court has consistently held 
that “[t]he Convention should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of 
international law of which it forms part . . . .” Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 81, 
100. 
 53. Banković, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 351–52. 
 54. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35–36 (1989). The case concerned 
extradition from the United Kingdom of a German national to the United States where prolonged 
detention on “death row” would arguably violate the Convention’s prohibition on torture and inhuman 
treatment. See Convention art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 005. 
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Convention’s safeguards “practical and effective,” given its object and purpose 
“as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings.”55 
Second, the court cited Drozd v. France for the “established proposition” 
that “the responsibility of Contracting Parties can be involved because of acts of 
their authorities, whether performed within or outside national boundaries, 
which produce effects outside their own territory.”56 Both in Drozd and in 
Loizidou, the court was silent on the normative underpinnings for this ground 
of jurisdiction. In a later admissibility decision, Issa v. Turkey, however, it found 
that responsibility for state conduct abroad had to be imposed because “Article 
1 of the Convention [could not] be interpreted so as to allow a State . . . to 
perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of another State, which 
it could not perpetrate on its own territory.”57 
The third and final “leg” of the Loizidou framework was new. “Bearing in 
mind the object and purpose of the Convention,” the court said, “the 
responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a consequence of 
military action—whether lawful or unlawful—it exercises effective control of an 
area outside its national territory.”58 Where states effectively do control an area 
outside their own territory, “the obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights 
and freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such 
control . . . .”59 
The question of the reach of Convention protection has caused difficulties 
respecting not only the responsibility attributed to each member state, but also 
the demarcation of a sphere of protection for the Convention system as a 
whole. In Banković v. Belgium, relatives of the victims of a NATO bombing 
campaign of Belgrade brought a claim against all Convention states that were 
also NATO members.60 In deciding whether the victims had been “within the 
jurisdiction” of the relevant member states at the time of the bombing, the court 
described the Convention as a “constitutional instrument of European public 
order” and referred to the “essentially regional vocation of the Convention 
system.”61 In addition to merely demarcating each states’ responsibility, the 
court for the first time referred to a “legal space (espace juridique) of the 
Contracting States,” the boundaries of which, taken together, limited the 
applicability of Convention protection as a whole.62 Because the bombing 
 
 55. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34–35. The court speaks of an “inherent obligation” not 
to extradite, noting that “it would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the 
Convention . . . were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another State where 
there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture . . . .” Id. at 35. 
 56. Loizidou, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23–24, citing Drozd v. France, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
at 29 (1992) (emphasis added). 
 57. Issa v. Tukey, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 567, 588 (2005). 
 58. Loizidou, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (emphasis added). 
 59. Id. 
 60. 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333. 
 61. Id. at 358. 
 62. Id. at 359. 
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victims, unlike Mrs. Loizidou in Cyprus, lived in an area that had never been 
covered by the Convention, they were left without protection even when 
affected by the actions of member states’ governments. The espace juridique 
doctrine immediately came under heavy criticism, and its current status is 
unclear.63 
As this brief overview demonstrates, the question of the territorial and 
personal reach of rights protection has been a difficult one to answer, both in 
the United States and in Europe. Even on the limited topic of extraterritorial 
governmental action, U.S. case law shows a wide range of alternative, 
foundational, substantive principles, leading to divergent questions and models. 
It is true that in debates on the reach of Convention protection in Europe, all 
commonly defended approaches at least revolve around some conception of 
control or actual authority. But even with regard to this main criterion, many 
questions remain, notably on the precise prerequisites for, and consequences of, 
a finding of sufficient control under the court’s different tests;64 the appropriate 
standard of review in cases in which sufficient control of any variety is found;65 
and the possibilities for states to deliberately relinquish control in order to 
avoid responsibility under the Convention. Finally, the disagreement over the 
Convention’s espace juridique doctrine shows that in Europe too, different 
substantive understandings of the nature of rights protection under the 
Convention have exercised a profound influence on the demarcation of its 
reach. 
C. Extraterritoriality and Other Foreign Elements 
Both in Europe and in North America, discussions on the reach of rights 
protection generally do not cover all types of foreign elements. Most commonly, 
courts and commentators adopt a limited perspective that only includes cases 
concerning extraterritorial state conduct. Even when attempts are made to 
 
 63. See, e.g., Michael O’Boyle, The European Convention on Human Rights and Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction: A Comment on “Life After Bankovic,” in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS TREATIES 125 (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004) [hereinafter 
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION] (“There have been few inadmissibility decisions which have given 
rise to such adverse comment and controversy as the Bankovic case.”). See generally Rick Lawson, Life 
After Bankovic: On the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights, in 
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION, supra, at 83; Erik Roxstrom, Mark Gibney & Terje Einarsen, The 
NATO Bombing Case (Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al.) and the Limits of Western Human Rights 
Protection, 23 B.U. INT’L L.J. 55 (2005). In particular, the reference to Banković in Issa, 41 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. at 589, is difficult to place. Although Issa concerned possible state action outside the espace 
juridique of the Convention (in Northern Iraq), this was apparently not, by itself, an obstacle to a 
finding of “jurisdiction” in the sense of Article 1. 
 64. It should be noted that the court itself continues to distinguish between its different tests for 
jurisdiction. See Isaak v. Turkey, App. No. 44587/98 (2006), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?sessionid=5054494&skin=hudoc-en (check “Decisions” 
then search “Application Number” for “44857/98”) (last visited May 28, 2008), at Section II.A.2.b. 
 65. See for example the distinction, post-Soering, between “ordinary” and “flagrant” violations of 
fair-trial rights abroad after extradition. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 45 
(1989). 
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develop a more comprehensive view, the relationship between extraterritorial 
conduct and other types of foreign elements often remains problematic. 
The European Court of Human Rights, for example, has in some decisions 
treated domestic acts with foreign consequences (of the Soering type) and 
foreign acts (of the Drozd type) together, as two manifestations of the 
jurisdiction problem.66 In other cases it has insisted on separating the two, 
noting that actions of a state “concerning a person while he or she is on its 
territory” are different altogether from jurisdictional issues.67 In the United 
States, analyses of the reach of rights protection traditionally focus heavily on 
state conduct abroad. There have, of course, been exceptions—such as 
Professor Louis Henkin’s path-breaking effort to address the “several small 
related subjects” of the rights of aliens within the United States, the 
applicability of the Constitution to persons outside the United States, and 
constitutional limitations on immigration law.68 But even such comprehensive 
perspectives do not generally take in all possible types of foreign elements. 
Professor Henkin’s study, for example, omits any discussion of cases concerning 
domestic action with effects abroad (like Mandel) or those concerning 
execution of foreign judgments in the United States.69 
This emphasis on extraterritoriality comes with two complications. First, it 
ascribes a crucial normative role to territory—a role it is, at the very least, 
questionable “mere soil” can or should actually play.70 Second, and more 
important for this article, both European and North American case law reveal 
the serious difficulties involved in determining whether a case concerns 
extraterritorial state conduct in the first place. Recall the case of Kleindienst v. 
Mandel,71 in which U.S. professors within the United States claimed that 
governmental refusal to admit a Belgian academic for a lecture tour deprived 
them of their listener’s rights under the First Amendment. Think also of the 
European Court’s decision in Banković v. Belgium,72 which dealt with aircraft 
bombings of buildings in Serbia—a non-Convention state—planned at NATO 
headquarters in Belgium and in the capitals of other Convention states. 
 
 66. Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23–24 (1995). 
 67. Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 354. In the more recent case of Ilaşcu, it 
seems that both strands of case law were again brought together under the heading of “acts which have 
sufficiently proximate repercussions on rights guaranteed by the Convention, even if those repercussions 
occur outside [the Contracting State’s] jurisdiction.” Ilaşcu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179, 264 
(emphasis added). 
 68. Henkin, supra note 10, at 11. Henkin explicitly acknowledged that all three of these topics lie 
removed from “the paths commonly trodden by students of the United States Constitution.” 
 69. See Neuman, supra note 7. Roosevelt’s discussion was explicitly limited to cases of 
extraterritorial state conduct. See Roosevelt, supra note 30, at 218 (discussing extraterritoriality). 
 70. See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 10, at 2504 (“[A] narrow fixation on . . . territoriality is at odds 
with . . . our most cherished principles of constitutionalism.”); id. at 2558 (“Simple locational analysis 
ought not to be the basis of our jurisprudence on constitutional rights.”). 
 71. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
 72. Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333. 
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In both Banković and Mandel, the labels “extraterritorial” or “domestic” 
are impossible to apply with any objectivity. One rather classic problem is that, 
in each case, determining the location of rights infringements depends on 
preestablished conceptions of what the relevant right actually protects.73 Mandel 
turned out to be a “domestic” case only because the First Amendment was held 
to guarantee listeners’ rights as well as speakers’ rights.74 And in Banković, the 
outcome depended on whether one understood the scope of the right to life in 
Article 2 of the Convention to protect against actual bombings only, or against 
careless planning as well.75 A second problem is that, because rights claims are 
ultimately directed against state authorities, it is always possible to argue that 
central authorities in state capitals were at least to some extent involved in 
breaches of rights—wherever they occurred.76 This makes using geography to 
differentiate between “foreign” and “domestic” cases acutely more difficult 
regarding state conduct than regarding the acts of private parties.77 
D. The Many Possible Effects of Foreign Elements 
The relevant decisions show, finally, that courts have not adopted a 
coherent perspective on the kinds of effects to be given to foreign elements. 
A first group of decisions that can be distinguished addresses the issue of 
scope, or reach, in a separate doctrinal step. In these cases, reach is framed as a 
threshold question,78 the answer to which turns on the kind of territory or 
groups of people covered by forum fundamental rights. Within this broad 
category, a further distinction can be made between (1) approaches that 
demarcate the boundaries of rights orders as a whole, and (2) those that 
 
 73. Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (“[A] violation of the [Fourth] 
Amendment is ‘fully accomplished’ at the time of an unreasonable governmental intrusion. For 
purposes of this case, therefore, if there were a constitutional violation, it occurred solely in Mexico.”). 
 74. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 764–65 (discussing “the right to receive information”). 
 75. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Canada, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 841, para. 60 (Can.) (Iacobucci, J., dissenting) 
(substantive guarantees of Charter privacy protection are “activated”; Canadian authorities had an 
obligation to comply with Charter requirements when drafting and issuing the letter of request to their 
Swiss counterparts). 
 76. See, e.g., Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973) (holding that a court has 
power to offer habeas corpus relief as long as authority holding the prisoner is within court’s 
jurisdiction); id. at 494–95 (“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, 
but upon the person who holds him . . . .”). In the European context, see Bui Van Thanh v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 16137/90, 65 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 330 (1990), cited in O’Boyle, supra 
note 63, at 131 n.25 (rejecting the idea that actions by immigration officials in Hong Kong—itself not a 
territory to which Convention protection had been extended by the United Kingdom—would fall 
within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom since actions were planned and managed in London). 
 77. For a discussion of the problems encountered by the U.K. House of Lords in their efforts to 
distinguish between “domestic” and “foreign” cases, see Ben Juratowitch, The European Convention 
on Human Rights and English Private International Law, 3 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 173, 185–86 (2007). 
 78. Note that if a rights order adheres to a principle of universality—rights are always in principle 
“applicable,” but their concrete effect may vary with circumstances—court decisions may look like one-
step approaches, even when they are not. For a similar distinction between one-step and two-step 
approaches in (private international) jurisdiction law, see Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of 
Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003, 1017–18 (2006). For a discussion of threshold questions in 
horizontal effect cases, see Gardbaum, supra note 15, at 770, and infra IV.D and note 169. 
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determine the reach of specific rights guarantees based on characteristics of the 
particular right in question. 
Justice Black’s opinion in Reid is an example of the first subcategory. In 
Reid, Justice Black concluded that “the Constitution in its entirety applied” to 
the trial abroad of the American wives.79 By this view, the underlying 
considerations demarcating the reach of U.S. constitutionalism as a whole—
Black’s principle of limited government—directly determine results; rights 
guarantees may be invoked in exactly the same way as they could be in purely 
internal situations.80 The European Court of Human Rights, by channeling most 
issues of reach through the general threshold question of jurisdiction,81 and the 
Supreme Court of Canada also, to a large extent, follow a model by which rights 
orders are demarcated in their entirety.82 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez can be 
seen as an example of the second subcategory. For Rehnquist, the question 
presented by the case was whether the Fourth Amendment applied to a search 
abroad,83 and the Chief Justice’s subsequent analysis was largely confined to the 
text and history of this specific Amendment.84 Approaches within this second 
subcategory could also look at the characteristics of a cluster or family of rights 
taken together to determine their reach. This arguably was the model adopted 
by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Reid. For Justice Harlan, the relevant 
question was “which guarantees of the Constitution should apply in view of the 
particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible 
alternatives . . . .”85 Ultimately, Justice Harlan found, “the question of which 
specific safeguards of the Constitution are appropriately to be applied in a 
particular context overseas can be reduced to the issue of what process is ‘due’ a 
defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular case.”86 Professor 
Gerald Neuman has interpreted this statement as a “global due process” model 
for all U.S. constitutional rights.87 It is entirely plausible, however, that Justice 
 
 79. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957). 
 80. Id. at 8–9 (“While it has been suggested that only those constitutional rights which are 
‘fundamental’ protect Americans abroad, we can find no warrant, in logic or otherwise, for picking and 
choosing among the remarkable collection of ‘Thou shalt nots’ which were explicitly fastened on all 
departments and agencies of the Federal Government by the Constitution and its Amendments.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 81. See, e.g., Ilaşcu v. Moldova, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1030, 1099 (“[J]urisdiction is a necessary 
condition for a Contracting State to be able to be held responsible . . . .”). 
 82. That is, in generic fashion, without regard to the substantive content of the specific right 
concerned. See, e.g., R v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597, at para. 1 (“[D]oes the Canadian Charter . . . apply 
to the taking of the appellant’s statement by Canadian police in the United States . . . ?”) (emphasis 
added). 
 83. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990). 
 84. Id. at 274–75. See also Boumediene v. Bush, Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196, 2008 WL 2369628, at *2 
(U.S. June 12, 2008) (asking the specific question whether petitioners “have the constitutional privilege 
of habeas corpus”). 
 85. Reid, 354 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Neuman, supra note 7, at 920. 
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Harlan intended the scope of his due-process principle to be limited to the 
context of a cluster of “trial rights” or “process rights,” such as those at issue in 
Reid itself, with other principles governing the reach of rights such as freedom 
of expression or religion. 
All approaches that focus on the reach of specific rights function, at least 
implicitly, against a background understanding of the outer boundaries of the 
relevant rights order as a whole. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s analysis of the reach 
of the Fourth Amendment can operate only if based on a threshold 
determination of the potential reach of U.S. constitutional rights in general—in 
his case, on an understanding that, in principle, territorial presence and a 
“substantial connection” with the United States are required for aliens to 
“receive constitutional protections.”88 In this sense, models that look at the 
substance of individual rights for the determination of their reach are, at least 
implicitly, two-step approaches. 
In a second main group of cases, however, the question of reach is not 
addressed separately, but integrated into the normally applicable doctrinal 
framework.89 Variations in the intensity or strength of protection may, in such 
cases, be achieved through the application of a “balancing of interests” 
paradigm.90 Within such a framework, (which applies to large areas of 
fundamental-rights protection in Canada, Europe, and the United States), the 
intensity of protection is altered through modifying—under the effect of foreign 
elements—the weight of interests deemed relevant. These interests may include 
individual interests of the rights claimant, governmental interests, third-party 
interests, and societal or systemic interests. Courts sometimes hold that asserted 
governmental interests are stronger in cases in which foreign elements are 
present—as in Mandel, in which the U.S. government’s power over immigration 
was at issue.91 In cases with foreign elements, individual interests are sometimes 
found to be less pressing, as in the Canadian search case of Schreiber, for 
example, in which only a diminished “reasonable expectation of privacy” was 
granted for records kept abroad.92 The Schreiber case also demonstrates another 
variation on the balancing-of-interests approach; the appeals court held that 
 
 88. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990). 
 89. These approaches necessarily operate on the basis of a background, or “threshold,” 
understanding of the outer limits of the reach of the relevant rights order. 
 90. Compare Corey M. Then, Note, Searches and Seizures of Americans Abroad: Re-Examining the 
Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause and the Foreign Intelligence Exception Five Years After United 
States v. Bin Laden, 55 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1060–61 (2006) (suggesting that the problem of searches and 
seizures of Americans abroad should be dealt with largely through application of standard Fourth 
Amendment doctrines) with Note, supra note 7, at 1677, 1682 (arguing for a “functional approach” that 
avoids the “tendency mechanically to apply domestic constitutional standards against extraterritorial 
government activity”). 
 91. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). These cases, of course, do not merely contain a 
foreign element; they have strong political implications as well. It seems that in many cases, “foreign” 
may to some extent be a proxy for “political.” For a discussion within the context of immigration, see 
K. L. Pringle, Silencing the Speech of Strangers: Constitutional Values and the First Amendment Rights 
of Resident Aliens, 81 GEO. L.J. 2073, 2074 (1993). 
 92. Schreiber v. Canada, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 841 (Can.). 
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because a prophylactic exclusionary rule could have no effect on searches by 
foreign authorities, systemic interests were less important in this setting.93 
Outside the balancing-of-interests paradigm, foreign elements are also seen 
to alter “the nature of the protection” offered by individual rights. This term, as 
used here, describes variations in the application of interpretative doctrines, 
specifically those doctrines that identify specific, proscribed, governmental 
conduct and protected individual behavior. The effect is perhaps most clearly 
visible in freedom-of-expression cases that either involve speakers abroad or 
alien speakers within the forum. Case law both in Europe and in the United 
States suggests that the character or the meaning of the general right to freedom 
of expression changes in these foreign-elements contexts.94 In the Mandel case, 
for example, the U.S. Supreme Court developed a test whereby aliens could be 
excluded based on the content of their speech as long as government authorities 
had “facially legitimate and bona fide reason[s]” for their exclusion.95 As even a 
cursory look at standard freedom-of-speech law in the United States will reveal, 
this is a doctrine that clearly has no application in purely internal First 
Amendment cases.96 It has also been argued that the First Amendment rights of 
resident aliens in the United States “fluctuate depending on the content of the 
speech at issue.” In purely internal situations, by contrast, “such content 
regulation is exactly what the First Amendment proscribes.”97 
Finally, similar variations in the nature of rights protection in cases with 
foreign elements can be seen in case law on the European Convention. In a case 
on the exclusion of the American Muslim activist Louis Farrakhan from U.K. 
territory based on the content of his expression, for example, the English Court 
of Appeals held that Article 10 of the Convention would be engaged only 
“where the authorities of a state refuse entry to an alien solely to prevent his 
 
 93. Schreiber v. Canada, [1997] 2 F.C. 176, para. 35 n.41 (Fed. Ct.) (Can.) (citing with approval 
Brulay v. U.S., 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967), which held that Mexican authorities searching a U.S. 
citizen’s car in Mexico were not subject to the Fourth Amendment); see also R v. Terry, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 
207, para. 26 (Can.) (“[A]ny attempt to bind foreign police by Canadian law would be impossible to 
regulate.”). 
 94. See generally Steven R. Shapiro, Commentary, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to 
Political Dissents, 100 HARV. L. REV. 930, 938 (1987). For discussions in the context of the European 
Convention, see R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 606, [53]–[56], [2002] Q.B. 
1391, 1413–14 (U.K.) (citing Omkarananda & the Divine Light Zentrum v. Switzerland, 25 Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 105, 117–18 (1981) (holding no interference with freedom of conscience 
guarantee “unless it can be established that the measure was designed to repress the exercise of such 
rights and stifle the spreading of the religion or philosophy of the followers”) and Piermont v. France, 
314 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995)). 
 95. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). 
 96. See id. at 784 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (finding that the government’s decision was based solely 
on its “desire to keep certain ideas out of circulation in this country”). 
 97. Pringle, supra note 91, at 2089 (emphasis in original); see also Steven J. Burr, Comment, 
Immigration and the First Amendment, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1896 (1985) (“In immigration cases, the 
Supreme Court has abandoned its usual approach to First Amendment issues.”). 
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expressing opinions within its territory”98—a much less-stringent doctrinal test 
than the one usually applicable under the Convention.99 
III 
CONFLICTS’ CONTRIBUTION: TOWARDS A  
DISCIPLINE OF FUNDAMENTAL-RIGHTS CASES WITH FOREIGN ELEMENTS 
A. Conflict of Laws and Fundamental-Rights Cases With Foreign Elements: 
Engaging the Foreign 
Traditional conflict-of-laws, or private-international-law, cases and the 
fundamental-rights cases discussed in part II share a basic and obvious 
connection: the presence of foreign elements of some kind. But conflict-of-laws 
and the rights cases share more than this one trait. Decisions in both areas rely 
heavily on the same language—“jurisdiction,” “reach,” “scope,” and 
“application”—and often refer to the same earlier case law.100 In both areas, 
courts often look for contacts to determine the scope of legal orders—think of 
the roles of citizenship and territory, or of the similarities between “doing 
business” in conflict of laws and “mutuality of obligation” in the rights cases. 
They are also alike in the extent of confusion they evince about basic issues 
such as the appropriate normative basis for the demarcation of the reach of 
forum law, the role of territoriality, and the foundational question whether the 
determination of reach should even be a distinct issue at all.101 
Given all these substantive and doctrinal parallels, it is surely surprising that 
in terms of disciplinary identity and configuration the two areas are so strikingly 
different. Whereas conflict of laws has a long and impressive history as a field of 
law, the reach-of-rights cases merely comprise, at best, “several small[,] related 
subjects which have been largely neglected.”102 Whereas many conflict-of-laws 
theories look at fact patterns from both within and outside the forum, most 
discussions on the reach of rights are limited to extraterritorial state conduct. 
 
 98. Ex parte Farrakhan, [2002] EWCA (Civ) at [56], [2002] Q.B. at 1414 (U.K.) (emphasis added). 
 99. Usually, exposing individuals to the threat of rights violations abroad, for example by 
extraditing them, breaches Convention standards only when the potential infringements are especially 
serious. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 45 (1989) (risk of a “flagrant denial of 
a fair trial”) (emphasis added). 
 100. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776 (1950) (discussing the standing of an alien to 
maintain any action in U.S. courts); id. at 765 (describing the main issue in the case as the “jurisdiction 
of civil courts”); see also Schreiber v. Canada, [1997] 2 F.C. 176, paras. 79–80 (Fed. Ct.) (Can.) (Stone, 
J., dissenting) (citing Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 (Can.) for the proposition that Canadians 
residing in other countries have “submitted to the foreign jurisdiction”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 
484 (2004) (citing Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570 (1908) for the proposition that “the 
courts of the United States have traditionally been open to nonresident aliens”); Neuman, supra note 7, 
at 918 (referring to the “lens of conflict of laws” offered by Joseph Beale’s strictly territorial vested-
rights doctrine); id. at 956–57 (arguing that judicial formulae in the seminal Supreme Court rights 
decision In re Ross “came from the conflict of laws”). 
 101. Cf. Kramer, supra note 12, at 280 (arguing for the resolution of choice-of-law problems by way 
of “interpretation,” through “canons of construction”). 
 102. Henkin, supra note 10, at 11. 
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And whereas many conflict-of-laws approaches apply the same doctrinal 
framework to cases from different areas of substantive law, cases on the reach 
of different fundamental-rights guarantees are rarely seen as presenting the 
same kind of problems. 
Conflict of laws can teach the rights cases the benefits of focusing on the 
unifying trait of foreign elements. An important part of the conceptual trouble 
courts have had in dealing with cross-border rights cases stems precisely from 
the failure to regard fundamental-rights cases with foreign elements as a 
coherent legal category, on the model of private-law cases with foreign 
elements. 
The suggestion of modeling treatment of rights cases with foreign elements 
on private international law raises the specter of advocating a “conflict-of-laws 
approach” to a problem not traditionally thought of as part of that field. This 
type of suggestion has a long and troubled intellectual history. Against this 
background, capturing the full benefits of a modeling approach requires 
developing a better understanding of the tension between conflict’s disciplinary 
coherence and its glaring internal divisions.103 This article addresses that tension 
by proposing a conception of generic private international law that the rights 
cases could take as a model. 
B. The Many Meanings of a Conflict-of-Laws Approach 
Modern private international law is characterized by an impressive array of 
approaches and methods that vie for prominence.104 This great variety in views 
makes it hard to reach consensus on the most basic issue of all—identifying 
conflicts’ “right question[s].”105 These internal divisions are replicated in calls for 
conflict-of-laws approaches to questions not traditionally regarded as within the 
field’s scope. Authors and courts issuing such calls generally single out their 
own favored conflicts theories and methods for application to new problems. 
The many meanings attributed to advocating a conflict-of-laws approach have 
important consequences for this article’s project and deserve somewhat more 
extended attention. 
The issue of the extraterritorial application of statutes in economic 
regulation offers an example.106 Judges and commentators have often argued for 
 
 103. See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631 (2005) 
(discussing internal debates among conflicts-of-laws theorists). 
 104. See Trachtman, supra note 13, at 993 (“Ever since Currie, Cook and Cavers discredited Beale’s 
‘vested rights’ theory, no successor theory has met with widespread acceptance.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 105. J. W. Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989). 
 106. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws: 
An Inquiry into the Utility of a ‘Choice-of-Law’ Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1801 (1992) (outlining 
three possible approaches to extraterritorial economic regulation taken from conflicts-of-laws theories). 
See generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, 
International Law and Some Suggestions For Their Interaction, in 163 RECUEIL DES COURS: 
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 311, 344–411 (1979-II). 
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adoption of a conflict-of-laws approach in this field.107 Conflicts theory is said to 
have informed the very first Supreme Court treatment of a possible 
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, the classic U.S. antitrust statute, 
in Justice Holmes’ famous 1909 opinion American Banana Co. v. United Fruit 
Co.108 Justice Holmes used Joseph Beale’s territorial private-international-law 
theory to support his conclusion that the Act could not apply overseas.109 Since 
that early decision, all major judicial approaches to the issue of extraterritorial 
application of antitrust laws have at some time either been informed by, or 
criticized on, the grounds of conflict-of-laws theories and principles. Invoking 
conflict-of-laws methods, theories, or principles in all these opinions and 
writings, however, has meant very different things to different people. Conflict 
of laws meant territoriality for Holmes in American Banana, a broad notion of 
comity for Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 
(Alcoa),110 case-by-case “Second Restatement balancing” for the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,111 and, again, 
comity for Justice Scalia in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,112 to name 
a number of prominent examples. 
More recently, the same tendency has been visible specifically in the call for 
a conflict-of-laws approach to the extraterritorial scope of U.S. constitutional 
rights.113 In an article on Rasul v. Bush, Kermit Roosevelt III turns to conflict-of-
laws theory to answer the question of the scope of the Constitution. Discarding 
alternative approaches, Roosevelt finally finds inspiration in what he calls a 
“proper conflicts theory”—which, unsurprisingly—turns out to be the particular 
method he favors for conflicts problems more broadly.114 
C. Conflicts Approaches and Generic Private International Law 
Any attempt to “export” conflict-of-laws insights must face up to the 
divergences mentioned above in the preceding section, either by choosing one 
 
 107. See generally William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument 
for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 103 & n.12 (1998) (discussing Justice Scalia’s views 
and listing references to further literature). 
 108. 213 U.S. 347 (1909); see Dodge, supra note 107, at 122; Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: 
Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 186 (1991). 
 109. Justice Holmes’s opinion does not refer directly to Beale or to vested rights, but does allude to 
a necessary connection between the place of conduct and applicable (foreign) law. See American 
Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 358. Holmes also cites the vested-rights decision of Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 
374 (1878), as an “extreme” application of the principle defended. Id. at 356. Interestingly, Holmes also 
uses his own proto-Realist theory of “law as prediction” to ground the result. Id. at 356–57. 
 110. United States v. Aluminium Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (referring to the 
“limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers; limitations which 
generally correspond to those fixed by the ‘Conflict of Laws’”). 
 111. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613–14 (9th Cir. 1976); 
see Philip J. McConnaughay, Reviving the ‘Public Law Taboo’ in International Conflict of Laws, 35 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 255, 276–77 (1999). 
 112. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817–18 (1993). 
 113. Roosevelt, supra note 30, at 2019, 2030 (extending his approach to include the “extraterritorial 
scope of federal law”). 
 114. Roosevelt, supra note 30, at 2064–65; see also Kramer, supra note 12, at 284–89. 
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approach over others, or by trying to find a common conception underlying the 
various approaches. 
In developing an approach to rights cases with foreign elements, choosing 
one specific conflicts method is, at the very least, prone to lead to 
terminological confusion.115 More fundamentally, however, although virtually all 
conflicts approaches contain profound insights into the business of demarcating 
legal orders, there does not seem to be one specific approach that can be 
transposed one-on-one to the fundamental-rights-cases setting. Bealean “vested 
rights” is concerned with recognition of legal status obtained under foreign law 
and, therefore, begs the crucial question of the scope of forum-rights 
guarantees. Savignian “closest connection,” or “seat” analysis relies on an 
apolitical conception of (private) law and on a high degree of substantive 
homogeneity between potentially applicable laws, both of which are generally 
not available for constitutional-rights law.116 Interest analysis focuses on 
effectuating governmental policies and has very little place for the idea of 
norms (principles) constraining state powers—an important element of many 
theories of rights protection.117 Finally, Professor Brilmayer’s rights-based 
approach is more concerned with limiting the forum’s adjudicative or 
prescriptive jurisdiction than with the guarantees states should offer to 
individuals who feel the effects of their actions.118 These and other problems 
must provoke a reevaluation of what exactly conflict of laws may contribute to 
dealing with rights cases with foreign elements. 
 
 115. See Ralf Michaels, EU Law as Private International Law? Re-Conceptualising the Country-of-
Origin Principle as Vested Rights Theory, 2 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 195, 211 (2006) (emphasizing “the need 
for a broader concept of private international law” and criticizing views that “[substitute] one approach 
for a whole discipline”); cf. Dodge, supra note 107, at 104 (criticizing Justice Scalia—a more recent 
advocate of a conflict-of-laws approach—for “fail[ing] to recognize that there is more than one 
‘conflict-of-laws’ approach to extraterritoriality” and “overlook[ing] the central question, which was 
not whether conflicts theory should be applied to questions of extraterritoriality, but rather which 
conflicts theory should be applied”). 
 116. On Savigny’s apolitical conception of private law, see FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, VOM 
BERUF UNSRER ZEIT FÜR GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [ON THE VOCATION OF 
OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE] 16 (1814). On Savigny’s universalism, see, for 
example, Ole Lando, Methods and Policies Underlying Decisions on International Conflict-of-Law 
Cases, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 230, 241 (1967) (“Savigny took it for granted that legal institutions have the 
same ‘nature’ in every country . . . .”). 
 117. Interest analysis does not generally distinguish between policies and principles in the 
Dworkinian sense. See, e.g., Note, Comparative Impairment Reformed: Rethinking State Interests in the 
Conflict of Laws, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1982). To the extent that Dworkin’s analysis is 
accepted, this is a weakness also in all purposive-interpretation approaches, such as Kramer’s and 
Roosevelt’s. 
 118. Professor Brilmayer argues for “[a] political rights model of choice of law” that “requires a state 
to justify its exercise of coercive authority over an individual aggrieved by the application of the state’s 
law.” Brilmayer, supra note 12, at 1297 (emphasis added). Professor Brilmayer noted in an earlier 
article that explaining “why it is fair to the complaining party to impose a law to which he or she 
objects” is both an element lacking from modern choice-of-law theories, and “the essence of 
constitutional adjudication.” Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without 
Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 459, 475 (1985) (emphasis added); see also Lea Brilmayer & Charles 
Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (1992). 
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The crucial current difference between conflict-of-laws and the rights cases 
is that conflicts is generally accepted as a coherent discipline of its own, with 
endowed chairs and journals, and on a par with other fields such as 
constitutional law or contract law. Behind the many, diverse conflicts methods 
and theories, and holding them all more or less together, would seem to lie a 
concept of generic private international law. 
It is very difficult to identify exactly what conflict-of-laws’ generic, 
disciplinary identity consists of. One way to approach this question could be to 
adopt a functional definition of the field—for example, “to resolve the conflicts 
that may exist between different private law systems.”119 Experience in other 
areas, however, most notably (public) international law and comparative law, 
highlights the difficulties involved in defining disciplines by means of a single, 
overarching question or objective whenever, as in private international law and 
these other fields, “almost every basic doctrinal position is . . . conceived in at 
least two voices.”120 In such a situation, it seems more fruitful to view 
disciplinary identity in terms of “a group of people sharing . . . [a] disciplinary 
consciousness or lexicon . . . composed of typical problems, a stock of 
understood solutions, a vocabulary for evaluating new ideas, a sense about their 
own history and a way of looking at the world.”121 The people within this group 
may very well disagree on many of the field’s specific issues; what matters is 
that the centrality of at least a number of these points of disagreement is widely 
accepted. 
From this vantage point, private international law’s central occupation with 
conflicts between systems of private law becomes, as David Kennedy has put it 
for public international law, “less . . . a description of fact than . . . the outline of 
a common professional vision”122—a vision, in conflicts’ case, of what could be 
called engaging the foreign. It is this vision that forms the backdrop to a number 
of basic loci for debate, and a set of canonical issues that the discipline finds 
interesting and around which it constitutes itself.123 At least four such issues 
 
 119. Michaels, supra note 115, at 211. For an early statement of this idea, see Carl Georg von 
Wächter, Ueber die collision der privatrechtsgesetze verschiedener staaten [On the Collision of Private 
Laws of Different States], 24 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS [ACP] 230 (1841), 25 ACP 1, 161, 
361 (1842) (F.R.G.), discussed in Kurt H. Nadelmann, Wächter’s Essay on the Collision of Private Laws 
of Different States, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 414 (1963). 
 120. David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 335, 343 (2000) (discussing also the drawbacks of defining international law through its object as 
“the law which governs relations between states”). See also the controversy in comparative-law 
literature over Alan Watson’s definition of the field as “the study of the relationship of one legal system 
and its rules with another”—a definition that is far from universally accepted. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL 
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 6 (2d ed. 1993). 
 121. David Kennedy, My Talk at the ASIL: What Is New Thinking in International Law?, 94 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 104, 104 (2000); see also J.M. Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 960 (1996) (defining disciplines as “groups of like-minded individuals”). 
 122. Kennedy, supra note 120, at 346. 
 123. Cf. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
963, 968, 985–87 (1998) (arguing that “there is no better way to understand a discipline . . . than to study 
what its members think is canonical to that discipline” and distinguishing between canonical arguments, 
problems and approaches, and narratives). 
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surrounding the question of engaging the foreign stand out:124 (1) the 
relationship between formalism and material outcomes in dealing with the 
foreign,125 (2) the question of parity between the foreign and the domestic,126 (3) 
the public–private distinction,127 and (4) the position of foreign norms in relation 
to both domestic and international ones.128 Paradoxically perhaps, the very 
intensity and scope of disagreement on each of these issues affirms their 
accepted centrality and thus, indirectly, the cohesiveness of the discipline of 
private international law. 
This stock of typical problems and solutions, combined with private 
international law’s distinctive vocabulary—from renvoi and “conflicts justice” 
to “procedural rose garden[s] on [a] well-watered plateau”129—and self-aware 
narratives of crises, revolutions, and stagnation,130 constitutes the discipline’s 
generic canon. What is important for purposes of this article is that research in 
 
 124. Compare the “conflicts diads” identified by Joel Trachtman: (1) predictability and admissibility 
vs. accuracy; (2) unilateralism vs. multilateralism; (3) private vs. public interests; and (4) courts vs. 
legislatures. Trachtman, supra note 13, at 995–98. The first three diads especially show a clear overlap 
with the questions identified here. It is submitted that Trachtman’s fourth diad is, out of all four, least 
distinctive for private international law. 
 125. See Laura E. Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in Conflict of Laws: The Paradox of 
Formalism, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 925, 928 (2004) (arguing that formalism is both part of the problem 
and part of the solution for conflict of laws); id. at 960 (“[F]ormalism emits a magnetic attraction for 
those who develop, refine, and apply choice of law doctrine.”); cf. Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third 
Conflicts Restatement?, 75 IND. L.J. 403, 415 (2000) (“The proposition that judges should be oblivious 
to the outcomes of the cases they decide is unique to the conflict of laws . . . .”); Friedrich K. Juenger, 
What Now?, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 509, 523 (1985) (“There is a widespread belief that the conflicts of laws is 
different from all other legal disciplines in that practical results and workability do not matter.”). See 
generally David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933) 
(reviewing famous approaches advocating substantivism over formalism). 
 126. For example, think of the controversy over Wächter’s, Currie’s, and Ehrenzweig’s forum bias. 
BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 3–76 (1963); ALBERT A. 
EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 322 (1962); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper 
Forum: A “Restatement” of the “Lex Fori Approach,” 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340, 345 (1965) (arguing for 
“the application of the domestic rule as the basic or residuary one”) (emphasis omitted); Wächter, 
supra note 119, at 237–39, 261–69. See also the immense body of literature in Europe on the status of 
“mandatory rules,” a discussion that began with P. Franceskakis, Quelques précisions sur les lois 
d’application immédiate et leurs rapports avec les règles de conflits de lois [Some Details on the Laws of 
Immediate Application and Their Relationship with the Rules of Conflicts of Laws], 55 REVUE 
CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [REV. CRIT. DR. INT. PRIV.] 1 (1966), discussed in 
Thomas G. Guedj, The Theory of the Lois de Police: A Functional Trend in Continental Private 
International Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 661, 662 & n.7 (1991). The multilateralism–unilateralism 
distinction also raises the question whether the foreign and the domestic should be treated equally. 
 127. Think of the controversy surrounding the “public law taboo” in conflict of laws. For an 
overview, see McConnaughay, supra note 111.  
 128. Cf. Alex Mills, The Private History of International Law, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 1 (2006) 
(discussing “the myth that private international law is not actually international, as it is essentially and 
necessarily a part of the domestic law of states”); Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 1, 8 (1991) (discussing “the separation of public and private international law in the United 
States which occurred while European scholars sought to unify those fields”). 
 129. See James A.R. Nafziger, Making Choices of Law Together, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 209, 232 
(2001) (combining topical references to Cavers and Leflar). 
 130. E.g., Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191, 1192 
(1987) (revolution, counter-revolution); Friedrich K. Juenger, How Do You Rate a Century?, 37 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 89, 114, 117 (2001) (revolution, stagnation); Arthur T. von Mehren, Recent 
Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 933 (1975) (revolution). 
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other fields has shown that disciplinary canons can have meaningful practical 
consequences.131 Most significantly, a canon can contribute to the perspective 
that cases raising similar issues belong to a single intellectual category. Such an 
inclusive perspective offers three main benefits. First, rule-of-law ideals and 
equal-protection concerns dictate that like questions be treated alike, a 
requirement that is difficult to satisfy without a clear understanding of relevant 
similarities and differences. Second, the existence of a canon facilitates 
exchange of knowledge on solutions to problems common to different 
traditional fields of substantive law or to different legal systems. Third, the 
process of canonization, by definition, standardizes or normalizes certain 
problems and relegates others to a discipline’s periphery, a development that 
greatly facilitates adequate norm design. 
Although each of these benefits may be contested,132 conflict-of-laws’ 
intellectual history arguably shows these elements’ positive influence. For 
example, most, if not all, conflicts theories claim across-the-board application, 
regardless of the substantive area of law involved.133 Such inclusive perspectives 
are important contributors to coherence and legal certainty. By way of another 
example, conflicts scholars of very different persuasions have often taken the 
same examples and constructed the same hypotheticals to elaborate on their 
own theories and critique those of others, facilitating the continuation of 
dialogue even during otherwise intellectually turbulent times. 
D. Towards a Discipline of Rights Cases With Foreign Elements: The 
Importance of Horizontal Questions 
Rather than transpose any single conflicts method to rights cases with 
foreign elements, the best way forward may be to look for clues in the structural 
characteristics of a generic conception of private international law. The 
structural quality that is arguably most helpful in thinking about the rights cases 
is the idea of “common” or “horizontal” questions. 
On a most basic level, then, the discipline of private international law shows 
the importance of developing a discipline of fundamental-rights cases with 
foreign elements. Rights cases with foreign elements—whether they involve 
extraterritorial conduct or not, and regardless from what field of substantive 
 
 131. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 827 (2004); see also 
Balkin & Levinson, supra note 123 (canons of constitutional law). 
 132. Each of these elements can obviously also constitute a drawback; a canon may wrongly exclude 
certain cases, problems may in fact require noncanonical approaches, and canons may foster obsession 
with outdated problems. See Hasday, supra note 131, at 830 (describing risks of a canon approach); 
Kennedy, supra note 121, at 104 (“[O]f course, a disciplinary vocabulary can also have limitations, 
characteristic blind spots and biases.”). 
 133. This would certainly seem to hold for the classic approaches of Savignian choice-of-law and 
Bealean vested rights. It is almost inevitable for rights- or fairness-based approaches like Brilmayer’s. 
Interest analysis has been propagated at least by Currie himself as setting forth an “entire theory of 
conflicts, not one limited to torts cases.” Patrick Borchers, Conflicts Pragmatism, 56 ALB. L. REV. 883, 
883 (1993) (citing CURRIE, supra note 126, at 77–127). The fact that the main impact of interest analysis 
has been limited to tort law does not undermine the theory’s (initial) ambitions. 
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law they arise—should be seen as presenting a coherent set of questions that 
must be dealt with through a coherent conceptual framework. Perhaps 
surprisingly, many rights orders currently do not follow this approach. 
Freedom-of-expression claims, to take an example, may play a role in cases 
within many different areas of substantive law. One possibility is immigration 
law—as Ernest Mandel found. Others are deportation law, international 
criminal law (think of the extradition of an activist who made speeches abroad 
but has since fled to the forum), and private international law (when the case 
concerns the enforcement of a Yahoo!-type foreign judgment said to infringe 
upon freedom of expression). Substantially similar pictures can be drawn for 
other fundamental rights, such as guarantees of religious freedom or against 
unreasonable searches. At present, information on these different types of cases 
tends to remain compartmentalized.134 
The same point holds for the types of factual situations in which foreign 
elements may be present. Understanding why a constitutional community might 
want to withhold freedom-of-expression protection to alien speakers abroad, 
for example, would benefit enormously from an understanding of why that 
same community does or does not offer freedom-of-expression protection to 
alien speakers within the forum. A coherent perspective on rights cases with 
foreign elements must be able to explain why speakers like Dr. Mandel do not 
have any First Amendment rights while outside the forum,135 whereas aliens who 
express themselves abroad and are subsequently faced with private 
enforcement actions in the United States do receive First Amendment 
protection.136 At present these two cases are not even treated together in any 
established legal field or doctrinal area. 
There is still one more element demonstrating the importance of identifying 
the proper range of questions involved in rights cases with foreign elements. As 
long as a comprehensive perspective is lacking, it will remain very difficult to 
“normalize” some rights cases that are not wholly internal to a single legal 
order. Without an understanding of the potential range of these cases and of the 
elements that unite them, it will be hard to identify what are core problems and 
what are peripheral issues, what are “freak questions” and what should be 
standard cases around which a doctrinal framework may be constructed.137 It 
 
 134. Consider the U.S. literature on foreign searches, in which parallels to other constitutional rights 
are rarely drawn. 
 135. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); see supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 136. See Marc D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171, 182–84 (2004) (discussing 
litigation at several courts in the case of Telnikoff v. Matusevich, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997)). 
 137. An overview of the historical development of Strasbourg and U.S. case law shows that much of 
these courts’ approaches have until now been shaped in highly idiosyncratic situations. The European 
Court’s first confrontation with a rights case not wholly internal to a single legal order came in a case 
involving the two “co-princes” of Andorra—a centuries-old political arrangement found nowhere else 
in the world that occupied a large part of the judgment in Drozd v. France, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
(1992). As noted by Lord Justice Sedley in the Al-Skeini decision of the English Court of Appeal, most 
of the European Court’s case law since Drozd has been shaped within one particular factual context: 
the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus. R v. Sec’y of State for Def. (Al-Skeini II), [2005] EWCA 
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may be this last factor that currently constitutes the highest barrier to adequate 
norm design. 
IV 
DEMARCATING CONSTITUTIONALISM:  
RESPONSIBILITY, THE PRIVATE, AND THE FOREIGN 
A. State Action and Fundamental-Rights Cases with Foreign Elements: 
Spheres of Constitutionalism 
Just as conflict-of-laws and rights cases with foreign elements share a basic 
connection, so too the rights cases and state action (horizontal effect) are 
intimately related. But whereas the ties between conflicts and the rights cases 
are readily evident and can be expressed relatively easily as a vision of engaging 
the foreign, the relationship between the latter two areas is less immediately 
obvious. The most powerful initial indication that such a relationship does, in 
fact, exist comes from both areas’ heavy reliance on the same language and, in 
particular, the same set of metaphors. State action and horizontal effect are 
concerned with “the proper reach of constitutional rights into the private 
sphere,”138 fundamental-rights cases with foreign elements with “the domain 
of . . . constitutionalism.”139 Similarly, a rights instrument either “does not apply 
to private litigation,”140 or “can have no operation in another country.”141 What 
these quotations suggest is that both fields are concerned ultimately—and in 
very similar ways—with the demarcation of spheres of constitutionalism, the 
most striking difference between the two areas being perhaps that the rights 
cases with foreign elements require a more literal take on what are merely 
spatial metaphors for state action and horizontal effect.142 
 
(Civ) 1609, [2006] 3 W.L.R. 508, 566 (Eng.). Further leading cases include Banković v. Belgium, 2001-
XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, handed down two months after September 11, 2001, Issa v. Turkey, 41 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 567 (2005), concerning recent Turkish military activities in the context of the war in Iraq, and 
Ilaşcu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179, dealing with the Moldavian breakaway territory of 
Transdniestria, where the political environment is so hazy that the court found it had to organize its 
own fact-finding mission. See Lawson, supra note 63, at 102–03. It is important to note that the 
development of case law in the United States has been similarly marked. Important innovations have, 
first of all, often been many years apart; Raustiala writes that the 1891 case of In re Ross, “set the 
doctrinal pattern for nearly seventy years.” Raustiala, supra note 10, at 2517. “The rarity of cases 
addressing geographical location,” Raustiala argues, “leads to a bumpy doctrinal path at best, 
schizophrenia at worst.” Id. at 2528. A telling example is the fact that a single 1950 Supreme Court 
decision, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), was crucial to both the Court’s discussion in 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), and the Court’s recent decision with regard to Guantánamo 
Bay, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); see also David W. Haller, Note, Within the States’ Jurisdiction: 
Metropolitan, Northeast Bancorp, and the Equal Protection Clause, 96 YALE L.J. 2110, 2110 (1987) 
(discussing the rarity of cases addressing the jurisdiction component of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 138. Gardbaum, supra note 15, at 761 (emphasis added). 
 139. Neuman, supra note 7, at 910 (emphasis added). 
 140. R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, para. 40 (Can.) (emphasis added). 
 141. In re Ross, 140 U.S. at 464 (emphasis added). 
 142. The sphere metaphor is pervasive in state-action thinking. The U.S. Supreme Court has held 
that the purpose of the state-action doctrine is to identify “where the governmental sphere ends and the 
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The two areas share more than reliance on the same language. For example, 
courts in both areas often look for contacts between governmental conduct and 
harm to individuals to determine the reach of rights.143 Both areas, too—and 
they share this characteristic with conflict of laws—reflect uncertainty about 
whether the question of reach should even be a distinct issue at all.144 
These substantive and doctrinal parallels suggest that the two areas may be 
alike in one further respect: the centrality of the question of how far a state’s 
responsibility for assuring the effectiveness of its rights order extends. For state 
action, the central position of the issue of responsibility is widely accepted.145 
“[T]he state action doctrine,” Sidney Buchanan has written about the U.S. 
context, “constitutes the conceptual framework within which the courts seek to 
determine the scope of governmental responsibility under the Constitution.”146 
Rights cases with foreign elements, on the other hand, are currently generally 
formulated more in terms of authority and power than through the prism of 
responsibility, obligation, or duty. Comparison with state-action controversies, 
it is argued, can serve to bring out the responsibility dimension in cross-border 
rights cases. If the crucial issue in state-action cases is the extent to which 
private elements affect the intensity of government responsibility for harm that 
is alleged to constitute a violation of individual rights, in the rights cases that 
same question can be asked regarding foreign elements. 
B. Jurisdiction, Authority, and Responsibility 
At present, the most familiar trope in discussions on the normative basis for 
distinguishing between purely internal rights cases and cases with foreign 
elements is the concept of jurisdiction in public international law.147 Many courts 
make standard references to the famous 1927 Lotus decision of the Permanent 
 
private sphere begins.” Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991); see also Louis 
Michael Seidman, The State Action Paradox, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 379, 393–94 (1993) (sphere of 
privacy in abortion decisions); Larry Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitutional 
Limits on Private Power, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 361, 367 (1993) (decisions in private sphere affect 
public life). 
 143. See infra text accompanying notes 177–180. 
 144. Compare Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, supra note 19, with Kramer, Rethinking 
Choice of Law, supra note 12. 
 145. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 473 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion) (responsibility as 
the “vital requirement” in state-action doctrine), cited in G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of 
the State Action Doctrine: The Search for Governmental Responsibility (Part I of II), 34 HOUS. L. REV. 
333, 333 n.1 (1997). 
 146. G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for 
Governmental Responsibility (Part II of II), 34 HOUS. L. REV. 665, 774 (1997); see also Susan Bandes, 
The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2285 (1990) (discussing the role of 
responsibility in state action doctrine); R. George Wright, State Action and State Responsibility, 23 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 685 (1989) (same). For a discussion of the role of responsibility in European 
visions of horizontal effect, see infra IV.C. 
 147. See Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, para. 57 (“The Convention should be 
interpreted as far as possible in harmony with other principles of international law of which it forms 
part.”). The court often refers to standard literature on jurisdiction in international law, such as F.A.P. 
Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, in 111 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED 
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  1 (1964-I). 
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Court of International Justice,148 to Oppenheim’s International Law,149 and to the 
legal status of ships and aircraft in international law.150 Jurisdiction in the public-
international-law sense, however, is concerned with the outer boundaries within 
which states may legitimately assert their authority, not with notions of 
responsibility towards individuals in specific cases. Knowing whether 
international law allows Canadian officers to interview suspects in the United 
States (Cook),151 or whether U.S. officials may conduct property searches in 
Mexico (Verdugo-Urquidez), tells us little or nothing about whether such 
officials should issue cautions or obtain warrants if and when they decide to 
act.152 As Justice L’Heureux-Dube wrote in her dissent in Cook, “the question of 
when the Charter applies is not properly determined by looking to the 
intricacies of extraterritoriality in international law . . . .”153 A very similar point 
was made by Justices Brennan and Marshall regarding the Fourth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution in their Verdugo-Urquidez dissent: 
Nor is the Warrant Clause inapplicable merely because a warrant from a United States 
magistrate could not “authorize” a search in a foreign country. Although this may be 
true as a matter of international law, it is irrelevant to our interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment.154 
What these cases say about the concept of jurisdiction in public 
international law is in multiple respects inadequate for determining the reach of 
rights protection. Instead of international norms limiting the abstract outer 
boundaries of authority as between states, what is needed are internal norms 
governing the assumption of responsibility towards individuals in specific 
cases.155 The doctrine that most closely matches these requirements is state 
action—or horizontal effect—in domestic constitutional law. 
 
 148. The Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). 
 149. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). 
 150. E.g., R v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597, para. 26 (Can.); R v. Sec’y of State for Def. (Al-Skeini I), 
[2004] EWHC (Admin) 2911, [225], [2005] 2 W.L.R. 1401, 1466 (Q.B.) (reference to the Lotus 
decision); R v. Sec’y of State for Def. (Al-Skeini II), [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1609, para. 3, [2006] 3 W.L.R. 
508, 514 (Eng.) (reference to OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW); Issa v. Turkey, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
567, 586 (2005) (reference to OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW). These references are baffling 
because virtually no fundamental-rights cases have ever concerned ships on the high seas, embassies, or 
any of the other typical settings for the discussion of jurisdiction in the international-law sense. 
 151. R v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597 (Can.). 
 152. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 296 (1990). Note that this is different from a 
situation in which a specific forum rights guarantee specifically demands compliance with law. In that 
case, it might be necessary to look at public international norms on sovereignty as part of the relevant 
test under the forum fundamental right. See, e.g., Öcalan v. Turkey, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 985, 1018–1019 
(2005). 
 153. Cook, [1998] S.C.R. 597 at para. 84 (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 154. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 296 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 155. Most modern theories of private international law accept that the reach of domestic law is at 
heart an internal issue. See, e.g., Hans W. Baade, Foreword: New Trends in the Conflict of Law, 28 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 674 (1963). To the extent this characterization is accepted, the necessity of a 
focus on internal norms might also be called a “lesson” from private international law. 
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C. Spheres of Responsibility: State Action and Fundamental-Rights Cases 
with Foreign Elements 
The idea of responsibility and the doctrines of state action and horizontal 
effect are intimately linked. In U.S. state-action cases, the central question, as 
formulated by the Supreme Court, is this: “In what situations should 
government be held in some way responsible” for harm that is alleged to 
constitute a violation of a constitutional right?156 Outside the confines of U.S. 
state action, the connection between doctrines of horizontal effect and ideas of 
responsibility are perhaps less immediately obvious. But this picture changes 
once responsibility is placed alongside its close relatives: duty and (positive) 
obligation. The European Court of Human Rights has never referred to the 
horizontal effect of Convention rights, strictly speaking, but it often uses a 
doctrine of positive obligations to achieve a largely equivalent effect.157 For 
example, the specific question of a positive duty for law-enforcement officers to 
protect members of the public against private aggressors has been classified as a 
state-action case in the United States and as a matter of positive obligations by 
the European Court of Human Rights.158 Transplanting this distinction between 
negative rights and positive obligations back to the U.S. context affirms the 
close connections between state action and positive duties or obligations for 
states.159 
The harm with which the state-action doctrine is concerned is the harm 
caused, at least to some extent, by private action. In pragmatic terms, in state-
action cases, governments claim that they are somehow less responsible because 
they themselves did not directly infringe fundamental rights. The same 
argument, however, can also be framed in the more abstract conceptual 
language of bounded normative orders. The central question then becomes 
whether responsibility under one set of norms—constitutional law—may be 
affected because of the involvement of elements from another realm—the 
 
 156. The term “responsibility” will be used throughout, primarily because this is standard 
terminology in the state-action case law and literature with which this article seeks to draw parallels. 
See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (describing one of the aims of the state-action 
doctrine as an effort to assure constitutional protection “when it can be said that the State is responsible 
for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains”); see also Susan Bandes, supra note 146, at 
2285 (“[T]he state action doctrine . . . seeks to identify the sphere of government responsibility.”); 
Buchanan, supra note 145, at 336; Snyder, supra note 19, at 1056–57. In Hohfeldian terms, the 
attribution of “responsibility” or of “obligation” will generally consist of the imposition of a “duty.” See 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 
YALE L.J. 16, 30–32 (1913). 
 157. See, e.g., Lech Garlicki, Relations Between Private Actors and the European Convention on 
Human Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION IN PRIVATE RELATIONS: EXPANDING CONSTITUTIONALISM 
129, 143  (András Sajó & Renáta Uitz eds., 2005) [hereinafter EXPANDING CONSTITUTIONALISM]; 
Gardbaum, supra note 15, at 769 (noting that Judge Garlicki’s essay demonstrates “significant 
analytical and practical overlap” between the doctrines). 
 158. Compare DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 195–97 (1989), 
with Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 3124, para. 101. 
 159. See in particular the discussions in Bandes, supra note 146, at 2272, and in David P. Currie, 
Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 884 (1986). 
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private. That broader question is directly applicable to the issue of 
constitutional harm in situations with foreign elements.160 The central normative 
issue in rights cases with foreign elements should be this: To what extent should 
the scope of governmental responsibility for the effectiveness of rights 
protection under forum rights guarantees be affected by the fact that a claim is 
not wholly internal to the forum rights order, but contains elements from 
another realm—the foreign? 
D. Rights Cases with Private Elements and Rights Cases With Foreign 
Elements 
Developing conceptual and normative connections between rights cases 
with private elements and those with foreign elements has the potential to bring 
a number of benefits. First, juxtaposing the two areas may help to place 
responsibility in the foreground as the primary normative basis for demarcating 
the reach of rights orders in cases with foreign elements. Although there is 
broad agreement that responsibility is the (or at least a) vital element of 
normative theories of state action and horizontal effect,161 its status respecting 
rights cases with foreign elements is much less firmly assured. The question of 
responsibility has, of course, already surfaced in the context of rights cases with 
foreign elements. Several of the approaches Gerald Neuman has identified in 
U.S. Supreme Court case law—including “mutuality of obligation” and “global 
due process”—exhibit some form of connection to the theme of responsibility,162 
as do several specific references in Supreme Court opinions.163 The European 
Court of Human Rights, in its seminal Loizidou v. Turkey judgment, used the 
language of responsibility in at least part of its normative framework for 
determining the reach of rights protection.164 And it should not be forgotten that 
the European Commission on Human Rights, from its first statements on the 
reach of Convention protection, adopted a comprehensive test of “actual 
authority and responsibility.”165 As the discussion above showed, however, the 
authority, or “jurisdiction,” component has received more attention from courts 
 
 160. Interestingly, Buchanan, in his seminal article on the conceptual history of state action 
explicitly excludes “the intriguing jurisdictional issues created by incidents of harm that transcend 
national boundaries.” Buchanan, supra note 145, at 336 n.13. 
 161. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 473 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion), cited in Buchanan, 
supra note 145, at 333. 
 162. Neuman, supra note 7, at 918–20. 
 163. For examples of the language of responsibility, duty, and obligation in rights cases with foreign 
elements, see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (“[T]he rights of a citizen, as 
to whom the United States has continuing obligations, are not presented by this case.”); Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (discussing correlation between the “Government’s obligation of 
protection” and the “duty of loyal support” inherent in citizenship); id. at 796 (arguing that  
responsibility is incurred when the United States occupies foreign territory) (Black, J., dissenting); and 
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487 (2004) (emphasizing “power and responsibility of courts to protect 
persons from unlawful detention”) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 164. Loizidou v. Tukey (Preliminary Objections), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 62 (1995). 
 165. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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and theorists, both in Europe and the United States. Comparison with state 
action could serve to re-equilibrate this focus. 
Second, placing the two types of rights cases alongside each other may 
enhance understanding of the relationship between a general, horizontal 
criterion of responsibility and the substance of specific fundamental-rights 
guarantees. A central debate in the field of state action concerns whether the 
question of responsibility should be addressed in a separate doctrinal step or 
whether this issue should be integrated into the ordinarily applicable analytical 
framework that looks directly at the substance of specific rights. Professor 
Erwin Chemerinsky has famously argued for the “elimination of the concept of 
state action” and for incorporating the question of the intensity of government 
involvement into an overall balancing test on the merits of each case.166 And 
Professor Mark Tushnet has very recently defended the thesis that “all the work 
of the third-party-effect doctrine . . . is done by the substance of constitutional 
norms.”167 Others have instead called for a two-step approach, warning against 
“collapsing the state action inquiry into the determination of the 
constitutionality of the state action.”168 An intermediate approach recognizes 
both the importance of looking at the substance of individual-rights guarantees 
and of maintaining a separate question on the sphere of governmental 
responsibility as a “threshold issue.”169 
Precisely the same discussion is underway regarding the applicability of 
forum fundamental-rights guarantees to cases with foreign elements. Some 
approaches advocate treating rights as—in principle—always applicable, but 
varying in strength depending on the intensity of the nexus between the alleged 
infringement and the forum government.170 Such universalist or global-due-
process theories follow very closely Chemerinsky’s proposal for state action. 
Others, in contrast, have defended keeping the question of the “scope” of rights 
protection distinct from the issue of the “intensity” of applicable rights.171 The 
similarities between these discussions suggest that much could be gained from 
explicating connections and attempting to learn from mutual experiences. 
Third, and most important, the replication of debates observed here may 
serve as the starting point for broader investigations into parallels between the 
 
 166. Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 506 (“Eliminating the concept of state action merely means that 
the courts would have to reach the merits and decide if a sufficient justification exists; courts could not 
dismiss cases based solely on the lack of government involvement.”). 
 167. Mark Tushnet, The Relationship Between Judicial Review of Legislation and the Interpretation 
of Non-Constitutional Law, With Reference to Third Party Effect, in EXPANDING 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 157, at 167, 180. 
 168. Snyder, supra note 19, at 1058 n.32. 
 169. Gardbaum, supra note 15, at 770; see also Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of 
Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L. REV. 387, 414–15 (2003). 
 170. See Neuman, supra note 7, at 919 (describing the various approaches). 
 171. E.g., Dominic McGoldrick, Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, supra note 
63, at 41, 42 (distinguishing between jurisdictional and substantive issues); Roosevelt, supra note 30, at 
2039 (describing the one-step analysis as “disturbing”). 
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private and the foreign. State action and horizontal effect often occupy central 
positions in modern constitutional theory. It is here that we find the most 
thorough and sustained discussion of foundational problems such as “the 
distinction between ‘action’ attributable to government . . . and ‘inaction’. . . for 
which the government bears no responsibility”;172 of the desirable extent of 
governmental neutrality towards “existing distribution[s] of wealth and 
entitlements”;173 of oppositions between positive and negative 
constitutionalism;174 and, of course, of the theme often seen as underlying all 
these dualities—the public–private distinction. 
Stressing parallels between the foreign and the private facilitates asking 
these crucial questions for rights cases with foreign elements. Governmental 
neutrality towards the “baselines”175 of domestic private law becomes neutrality 
towards the status quo outside a state’s borders and outside its community of 
citizens. Preserving a “sphere of private liberty” becomes respecting the 
sovereign choices of other states. And in more general terms, the profound and 
influential problematization of the idea of governmental responsibility that has 
taken place with regard to state action, horizontal effect, and positive state 
obligations for much of the past century would become available for rethinking 
rights cases with foreign elements.176 Even if none of the debates on state action 
and horizontal effect lead to any widely accepted outcomes, the mere fact of 
recognizing their replication in the field of foreign elements means pushing this 
comparatively neglected topic to its rightful place at the center of any theory of 
constitutionalism. 
E. Rights, Responsibility, and Conflict of Laws 
Both conflict of laws and state action contain insights that are indispensable 
for an appropriate understanding of rights cases with foreign elements. But 
placing the connections between these three fields in the foreground may also, 
ultimately, contribute to a rethinking of the nature of conflict of laws itself. 
State action and conflict of laws share the idea of focusing on contacts as a 
means to demarcate the reach of norms. U.S. courts have long accepted the 
importance of a “nexus” or “contacts” inquiry in state-action cases.177 Modern 
state-action doctrine consists of a multitude of separate tests that all aim to 
 
 172. Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary 
Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1026 (1987). 
 173. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987). 
 174. See generally Seidman, supra note 172; Bandes, supra note 146. 
 175. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 173, at 874. Note that it is irrelevant for the argument made here 
whether, as a historical matter, Sunstein’s account of the Lochner Era is correct. See David E. 
Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX L. REV. 1 (2003) (criticizing Sunstein’s “baseline” theory 
of Lochner). 
 176. See sources cited supra notes 172–174; see also Wright, supra note 146. 
 177. The test is implicit in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972). See also Jackson 
v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (“[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently 
close nexus between the State and the challenged action.”); Buchanan, supra note 145, at 347; 
Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 508. 
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evaluate the intensity of the contacts between the state and an individual’s claim 
in order to determine the extent of state responsibility and, thus, the reach of 
constitutional norms.178 Conflict of laws also habitually relies on contacts or 
nexus theories. In conflict of laws, however, these concepts are used to 
determine legitimate authority—prescriptive or adjudicative jurisdiction—and 
not generally to attribute responsibility or obligation. In fact, comparison with 
state action and the rights cases brings out the surprising fact that responsibility 
plays hardly any discernable role at all in either classical or modern conflicts 
thinking. The interest-analysis project, for example, is concerned with the ways 
in which interestedness, measured through contacts, may ground the legitimate 
exercise of authority over outsiders.179 Lea Brilmayer’s important rights-based 
alternative also works in terms of power, utilizing a conception of fundamental 
rights to determine when it is fair for the forum to submit outsiders to its rule.180 
Neither of these approaches tries to identify when governments should be 
responsible for outsiders, broadly defined. 
One important conflicts approach that expressly does grant some role to 
ideas of responsibility comes from Professor Joel Trachtman. The core element 
of Professor Trachtman’s proposal is the idea to “allocate power consistently 
with responsibility.”181 Responsibility, in turn, “is derived from effects on 
constituents: a government . . . must take responsibility, to the extent that its 
constituents are affected.”182 This perspective on responsibility, however, omits 
the crucial question whether governments might ever be responsible for anyone 
other than their constituents.183 This absence of the issue of responsibility from 
conflicts thinking may be an important source of some of the field’s internal 
confusions. The discipline’s focus on authority and jurisdiction may have 
contributed to an undervaluation of the themes of responsibility, duty, and 
positive obligation towards those who are in some way outsiders to the forum’s 
legal order. But, by looking only at interestedness in without responsibility for, 
or at authority over without obligation to, conflict of laws is in an important way 
incomplete. 
There are at least two ways to sustain a plea for a more dominant role for 
responsibility in conflict of laws. The first looks at developments in substantive 
private law. As domestic private law in many systems is increasingly 
influenced—for better or for worse—by fundamental-rights concerns, the 
question of the appropriate scope for effectuating domestic guarantees will at 
some point have to be incorporated into conflicts doctrine. If large swathes of 
 
 178. Compare Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 506, with Snyder, supra note 19, at 1056–57. 
 179. See generally John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State’s Interest in Protecting its Own, 23 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981). 
 180. See generally Brilmayer, supra note 12. 
 181. Trachtman, supra note 13, at 985–86. 
 182. Id. at 986. 
 183. See Roosevelt, supra note 30, at 2049 (referencing  Currie’s “selfish state” and its interest only 
in the welfare of its own citizens); Dane, supra note 130, at 1202 (“Which persons [should the State act 
on behalf of]? Obviously, persons within the state’s political community . . . .”). 
BOMHOFF_BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC 10/6/2008  10:18:14 AM 
Summer 2008] THE REACH OF RIGHTS 71 
ordinary private law are progressively “constitutionalized” under the influence 
of fundamental-rights concerns, it may well become intellectually incoherent 
not to bring the issue of demarcating the reach of these private-law norms 
within the ambit of these same fundamental rights.184 Second, analogies such as 
those drawn in this article may promote the importance of responsibility in 
private international law. If the relationship between public constitutionalism 
and the private sphere is indeed anything like the relationship between 
domestic constitutionalism and the foreign sphere, it would seem plausible that 
in both cases, theories and methods of demarcation should be similar. Both 
conflict of laws and state action will always be, to a large extent, about 
competing claims of authority: governmental power versus individual liberty 
and versus the legitimate interests of other sovereigns. But if the theme of 
responsibility is a second vital element in state action, there should at least be 
some measure of life for it in the conflict of laws. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
In superficially different but ultimately very similar ways, private 
international law, state action, and rights cases with foreign elements are all, in 
the end, about establishing the boundaries of normative orders—be they public 
or private, domestic or foreign. In this respect, all three fields are instances of 
conflicts of laws. 
This article has been concerned with stressing the similarities and parallels 
between these three areas, with the primary aim of developing a better 
understanding of rights cases with foreign elements. Regarding both these 
analogies and the rights cases in general, much work obviously remains to be 
done. Further analysis may confirm fundamental connections between the three 
areas. It could be, for example, that a widespread and uncontroversial 
acceptance of state-action doctrines—or of horizontal effect—correlates 
empirically with a broad application of forum fundamental rights to cases with 
foreign elements, and vice versa.185 Whichever way these links ultimately come 
to be viewed, however, it seems certain that developing a more comprehensive 
understanding of both the technicalities and the substantive commitments 
involved in establishing the reach of rights will be a task of the greatest 
importance, as constitutionalism’s reach over the foreign progressively joins—
or replaces?—its relation to the private as a central theme in constitutional 
thinking. 
 
 184. This development may be reinforced when private liability of government agents becomes 
more widely accepted, or when traditionally public tasks are privatized. 
 185. The incomplete comparisons of U.S., European, and Canadian case law in this article would 
suggest that this correlation holds at least to some extent, with European and Canadian case law being 
more open both to horizontal effect—or positive obligations—and to the application of rights 
guarantees in cases with foreign elements. 
